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1. Introduction 
 In October 2000, the US Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow revenue from 
antidumping and countervailing duties to be distributed to US firms that petition or support the 
application of those duties. This is the so-called Byrd Amendment,1 which is officially known 
as the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (the CDSOA). US firms eligible for 
distribution are not only protected by antidumping duties but also receive offset payments, thus 
receiving double protection.2 
 Foreign firms that export to the US and their home countries criticize the US CDSOA as 
being contrary to the Antidumping Agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Many economists, such as Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004), support this argument.3 In July 
2001, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Community (EU), India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
and Thailand called for the WTO to investigate the CDSOA. In September 2001, the panel 
judged the CDSOA to be inconsistent with US obligations under the WTO Antidumping 
Agreements and directed the US to withdraw it. Although the US appealed to the WTO, in 
January 2003, the appellate body concluded that the CDSOA was inconsistent with WTO 
rules. However, the US Congress has not yet repealed the Byrd Amendment, and many US 
companies, particularly those in the bearing and steel industries, have received offset 
payments.4 In the fiscal year 2003, US$280 million was distributed among 2,100 claimants.5 
The EU and Canada in May 2005 and Japan in September 2005 put tariffs on particular goods 
to counter the CDSOA.6 Eventually, the bill that repeals the Byrd Amendment passed the US 
Congress in December 2005 and January 2006. However, the amendment is valid until October 
2007 and thus is still posing a problem for the international economy. 
 Studies of the antidumping duty include those of Dixit (1988), Anderson (1992), Prusa 
(1992), Staiger and Wolak (1992), Reitzes (1993), Anderson, Schmitt and Thisse (1995), 
                                                 
1 The Byrd Amendment is named for Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who introduced the amending 
Act. 
2 A similar policy is being employed in the beef industry of Japan. Tariff revenues from beef imports are 
distributed among domestic livestock breeders.  
3  Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004) state that the Byrd Amendment unambiguously provides excessive 
protection to US producers because the antidumping duty level in the US is the same as the dumping margin. 
4 See Grimmett and Jones (2005) for details of companies that received the offset payments. 
5 See WTO (2004, p. 48) for detail. 
6 In October 2004 the WTO approved the countermeasures against the US CSDOA. 
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Rosendorff (1996), Blonigen and Park (2002, 2004), and Konings and Vandenbussche (2005). 
However, the CDSOA is not treated in these studies. In spite of its growing importance to the 
world economy, surprisingly few studies address this issue; exceptions are Collie and 
Vandenbussche (2004) and Schmitz and Seale (2004). Instead of explicitly modeling the 
tax-revenue transfer to home firms under the CDSOA they simply regard it as a change in the 
welfare weight attached to the tax revenue, that to home firms’ profits or that to consumers’ 
surplus. Moreover, they assume the antidumping duty to have a specific form. In this setting 
the CDSOA does not directly affect any firm behavior. It does so only if the government 
changes the tariff rate following the change in the welfare weight under the CDSOA.  
 When analyzing the CDSOA, however, it would be more suitable to model a 
tariff-revenue transfer to home firms explicitly. Furthermore, a specific tariff may be 
unsuitable for the present analysis if Cournot oligopoly is considered since any firm behavior is 
then unaffected. A home firm takes foreign firms’ supply as given and thus considers revenue 
from a specific tariff to be intact from its own behavior.7 A foreign firm’s behavior is also 
independent of the transfer. It should also be noted that in reality an antidumping duty is mostly 
of not a specific, but an ad valorem, form. 
 Not only to avoid the abovementioned problem but also to consider more plausible policy 
options, we consider a Cournot duopoly model with an ad valorem tariff and regard the 
CDSOA policy as a change in the rate of tariff-revenue distribution to the home firm. In this 
framework the CDSOA directly affects the home firm’s behavior and the Cournot equilibrium 
even if the tariff rate does not change. We examine the effect of the CDSOA on the output and 
profit of the home firm, those of the foreign exporting firm, and home total surplus under the 
following two scenarios. One is the case where the tariff rate is predetermined and the other is 
that where the tariff rate is optimally adjusted to a change in the distribution rate.  
 We shall find that the CDSOA works as if it facilitates a tacit collusion between the home 
and the foreign firm at the cost of consumers’ surplus especially when the tariff rate is 
predetermined. Under the CDSOA the home firm restricts output so that the foreign firm 
increases production and pays higher tariffs. Eventually total supply decreases and thus 
consumers are worse off while the home firm and the foreign firm always enjoy greater profits. 
Home total surplus may increase or decrease depending on the market size and the two firms’ 
marginal costs. It indeed increases if the CDSOA is applied to supporting a very inefficient 
                                                 
7 We shall more clearly show this property in footnote 9. 
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home firm. Even if the tariff rate is optimally chosen following the CDSOA, essentially the 
same property holds especially when the home firm faces strong foreign penetration.  
 After presenting the model in section 2, we first treat the case where the tariff rate is 
predetermined in section 3. In section 4 we extend the analysis to the case where the tariff rate 
is also optimally chosen following the distribution rate. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 We consider a Cournot duopoly model in which a home and a foreign firm supply a 
homogeneous commodity in the home market. The home government imposes ad valorem 
tariff r on the supply of the foreign firm and distributes a part of the tariff revenue, whose ratio 
is θ, to the home firm.8 When the import price is p*, the domestic price is p (= (1 + r)p*) and the 
foreign firm’s supply is y, the total tariff revenue is  
 rp*y = γpy   where  γ = r/(1 + r). 
From the tariff revenue the government transfers θγpy to the home firm and receives only (1 − 
θ)γpy. Since tariff r satisfies 0 < r and the transfer is non-negative and does not exceed the total 
tariff revenue,  
 0 < γ < 1,   0 ≤ θ  ≤ 1. (1) 
 In this setup the profit of the home firm π and that of the foreign firm π* are respectively 
 π = f(D)x + θγf(D)y − c(x), 
 π* = (1 − γ)f(D)y − c*(y), (2) 
 D = x + y, 
where x is the home firm’s output, and c(x) and c*(y) are respectively the cost functions of the 
home and the foreign firm that satisfy 
 c′ > 0,   c″ ≥ 0,   c*′ > 0,   c*″ ≥ 0. 
D is home demand and f(D) is the inverse demand function that satisfies 
                                                 
8 An antidumping duty is aimed to offset, partly or completely, the difference between the domestic price in 
the exporting country and the export price. Since the domestic price in the exporting country is exogenous in the 
present setting, an advalorem tariff and an antidumping duty have a simply positive relationship. Thus, we can 
replace the latter by the former in the present analysis.  
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Assumption 1.   f′ < 0   and   f″m + f′ < 0   for any m ∈ (0, D). 
 
The first property implies the demand curve to be negatively sloped and the second one 
represents the normal case presented by Seade (1980). From (2), the optimal levels of x and y 
satisfy  
 πx = (x + θγy)f′ + f − c′ = 0, (3) 
 π*y = (1 − γ)( f′y + f) − c*′ = 0, (4) 
where πx = ∂π/∂x and π*y = ∂π*/∂y. Obviously a change in θ varies the equilibrium values of x 
and y.9 
 Finally, home total surplus is the sum of the home firm’s profit presented in (2), the tariff 
revenue left for the government, which equals (1 − θ)γfy, and consumers’ surplus CS. It is 
given by 
 W = f(D)x − c(x) + γf(D)y + CS, (5) 
where CS satisfies  
 dCS = − Df′dD. (6) 
 
3. The CDSOA under a Predetermined Tariff Rate 
 First, we assume tariff rate γ to be predetermined by the home government. Given γ, total 
differentiation of (3) and (4) yields 
 πxxdx + πxydy = − γf′ydθ, 
 π*yxdx + π*yydy = 0, 
where πxx = ∂2π/∂x2, πxy = ∂2π/∂x∂y, π*yx = ∂2π*/∂y∂x and π*yy = ∂2π*/∂y2. From these two 
equations we obtain 
                                                 
9 If specific tariff t is imposed instead, π = f(x + y)x + θty − c(x) and π* = [f(D) − t]y − c*(y). Since θty works 
as a lump-sum transfer to the home firm in this setting, the home firm determines x so that ∂π/∂x = f(x + y) + f′(x + 
y)x − c′(x) = 0, which does not depend on θ. Since the optimal level of y is also independent of θ, the Cournot 
solution is unaffected by θ, as mentioned in the introduction. 
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 dx/dθ = − γf′yπ*yy/Π, (7) 
 dy/dθ = γf′yπ*yx/Π, (8) 
 where   Π = πxxπ*yy − πxyπ*yx. 
 From assumption 1 and (4), π*yx satisfies 
 π*yx = (1 − γ)(f″y + f′) < 0. (9) 
For the concavity of the profit functions and the stability of the present duopoly we assume 
 
Assumption 2.  πxx < 0,  π*yy < 0,  Π > 0. 
 
From (7)-(9) and assumptions 1 and 2, we find 
 dx/dθ < 0,   dy/dθ > 0, (10) 
i.e., an increase in distribution rate θ reduces the home firm’s output and increases the foreign 
firm’s output. 
 Turning to the effect of distribution rate θ on the two firms’ profits, differentiation of (2), 
(4) and (10) give 
 dπ*/dθ = (1 − γ)f′y(dx/dθ) > 0, (11) 
i.e., an increase in the distribution rate raises the foreign firm’s profit. It further implies that the 
foreign firm’s profit becomes largest when all the tariff revenue is distributed to the home firm. 
From (2), (3) and (8) we obtain  
 dπ/dθ = [(1 − γ)γyf′/Π][(f′ + yf″)c′ +{2f′ + (x + θγy)f″}f] 
             + [γyf/Π][c″c*″ − c″(1 − γ)(2f′ + yf″) − c*″{2f′ + (x + θγy)f″}]. (12) 
Under assumptions 1 and 2, (12) satisfies 
 dπ/dθ > 0, (13) 
i.e., an increase in θ raises the home firm’s profit. The home firm’s profit is also maximized 
when all the tariff revenue is distributed to it.  
 Finally, from the partial derivative of (4) with respect to y, (7), (8) and (9) we obtain  
 dD/dθ (= dx/dθ + dy/dθ) = γf′y[− (1 − γ)f′ + c*″]/Π < 0. (14) 
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From (6) and (14) it is evident that an increase in θ reduces consumers’ surplus CS and that CS 
is minimized when all the tariff revenue is distributed to the home firm.   
 We summarize the properties given by (10), (11), (13) and (14) as follows: 
 
Proposition 1.  If the government raises the ratio of tariff revenue distributed to the home firm 
under the CDSOA, the home firm decreases, and the foreign firm increases, output. 
Consequently, both firms receive higher profits whereas consumers’ surplus decreases. 
Furthermore, distributing all the tariff revenue to the home firm is most desirable for both firms 
and most harmful for consumers. 
 
 As the distribution rate increases, the home firm behaves so that the tariff revenue 
increases. In doing so it reduces output so that the foreign firm expands supply and the price 
rises, both of which increase the tariff revenue. Consequently, not only the home firm but also 
the foreign firm enjoys a larger profit. Only the consumers of this commodity suffer a welfare 
loss from the price rise.10 Thus, the CDSOA facilitates a tacit collusion between home and 
foreign firms that enables them to raise price and enjoy higher profits at the cost of consumers’ 
surplus. Note that an antidumping duty alone works on the two firms’ outputs oppositely to the 
CDSOA –i.e., the foreign firm reduces output and the home firm supplies more.11  
 A similar tacit collusion also arises under a voluntary export restraint (VER).12 However, 
it makes the foreign firm restrict export and thereby brings higher profits to both firms. In 
contrast, the CDSOA urges the foreign firm to produce more and pay more tariffs, benefiting 
both firms.  
 Let us next investigate the effect of a change in the distribution rate on home total surplus 
W given by (5). From (2) - (6), dW/dθ is 
 dW/dθ = [− D + (1 − θ)γy]f′dx/dθ ＋[γf  − (1 − γ)yf′]dy/dθ, (15) 
                                                 
10  Obviously consumers’ surplus CS indicates the benefit of the households that consume the present 
commodity. The tariff revenue left for the government (1 − θ)γpy and the home firm’s profit π are distributed 
among all households, whether they consume the commodity or not, in the home country as transfers and 
dividends respectively.  Total surplus W is given by the sum of all of them. 
11 See, for example, Dixit (1988) and Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998, p. 403) for this property of 
an antidumping duty or an import tariff.   
12 Such a mechnism of a quantitative trade restriction is first modelled by Itoh and Ono (1982), Ono (1984) 
and Krishna (1989). Rosendorf (1996) shows that a foreign firm imposes a VER leading to such a tacit collusion 
in order to avoid the importing country to levy an antidumping duty.  
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where dx/dθ and dy/dθ are given by (7) and (8). In order to make the welfare effect tractable, 
we assume a linear demand function and constant marginal costs of the two firms: 
 f (D) = β − αD,  c′(x) = c = constant,  c*′(y) = c* = constant. (16) 
Under (16) optimal conditions (3) and (4) give the equilibrium values of x and y: 
 x = [(1 − θγ)β − 2c + (1 + θγ)c*/(1 − γ)]/[α(3 − θγ)], 
 y = [β + c − 2c*/(1 − γ)]/[α(3 − θγ)]. (17) 
Substituting these values and (16) into (15) yields 
 AdW/dθ = − (3 − 2γ)(β/c*) + [3 + 2γ(1 − θ)](c/c*) ＋γ[θ − (1 − θ)/(1 − γ)], 
 where  A = α(3 − θγ)2/(γyc*) > 0. (18) 
 By equalizing (18) to zero we obtain the optimal θ as a function of β/c* and c/c*: 
 θ = θopt(β/c*, c/c*). 
In order for this value to be indeed optimal, total surplus function W must be concave with 
respect to θ and thus  
 d2W/dθ2 = (2γ/A)(1 + 
)1(2 γ−
γ  − c/c*) < 0. (19) 
From (18) and (19) θopt satisfies 
 ∂θopt/∂β = (3 − 2γ)/[Ac*d2W/dθ2] < 0,  
 ∂θopt/∂c = − [3 + 2γ(1 − θ)]/[Ac*d2W/dθ2]  > 0, 
 ∂θopt/∂c* = − γ[θ − (1 − θ)/(1 − γ)]/[Ac*d2W/dθ2]. 
Note that ∂θopt/∂c* can be either positive or negative. It is because a rise in c* works as if it 
lowers β and c at the same time, as seen from (18), generating positive and negative effects on 
θopt. These results are summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 2.  The larger the market size is or the lower the marginal cost of the home firm is, 
the lower the optimal distribution rate is. A rise in the foreign firm’s marginal cost can either 
raise or lower the optimal distribution rate. 
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 As stated in proposition 1, the CDSOA urges the home firm to reduce output and give a 
larger market share to the foreign firm so that the tariff revenue from the foreign firm increases. 
In this process the total output decreases and thus consumer’s surplus declines. Having this 
property in mind, let us discuss the mechanism behind proposition 2. As market size β is larger, 
the loss of consumers’ surplus generated by the CDSOA increases, causing the optimal 
distribution rate to decrease. As the home firm’s marginal cost c increases, the difference 
between the price and the marginal cost declines, implying that the cost of a reduction in the 
home firm’s output due to the CDSOA decreases. Thus, the optimal distribution rate increases.  
 The effect of a rise in c* on the optimal distribution rate is twofold. It lowers the effect of 
a reduction in the home firm’s output on an expansion in the foreign firm’s output. Thus, the 
beneficial effect of the tariff-revenue distribution decreases. However, it raises the equilibrium 
price, causing the tariff revenue per foreign output to increase. Thus, the benefit of expanding 
the foreign firm’s output owing to the tariff-revenue distribution increases. Because of these 
two opposite effects we obtain the mixed result. 
 Note that the optimal distribution rate can even be zero (no distribution to the home firm) 
or 1 (full distribution to the home firm). In fact, from (18) we find 
 AdW/dθ⏐θ = 0 = − (3 − 2γ)(β/c*) + (3 + 2γ)(c/c*)  − γ/(1 − γ), 
 AdW/dθ⏐θ = 1 = − (3 − 2γ)(β/c*)  + 3(c/c*) ＋γ. (20) 
If market size β is large enough in comparison to c, the value of the first equation is negative.13 
Thus, in this case θopt is 0, implying that no distribution of the tariff revenue to the home firm is 
optimal. If market size β is small enough, the second equation of (20) is positive, implying that 
θopt is 1.14 Thus, full distribution of the tariff revenue to the home firm is optimal. Furthermore, 
if β is so small or c is so large that the home firm’s supply given by (17) is negative when θ = 1, 
the government should set a high enough distribution rate for the home firm to stop producing 
the commodity.15  
                                                 
13 In this case x and y given by (17) are positive, and thus the policy with θ = 0 is feasible.  
14 If β is too small or if c is too large, x given in (17) becomes negative. In order for x and the second equation 
of (20) to be both positive, c must satisfy [(1 − γ)(β/c*) + (1 + γ)/(1 − γ)]/2 > c/c* > (1 − 2γ/3)(β/c*) − γ/3. This 
range exists if β/c* < (1 + 2γ)/(1 − γ). All these conditions are satisfied if e.g. γ = 0.3, β/c* = 2 and c/c* = 1.6. 
15 Under the US CDSOA, however, a firm is not entitled to receive tariff-revenue payments unless it actually 
produces the commodity. Thus, the optimal distribution rate is such that the home firm produces the minimal 
amount required to be identified as a firm in production.  
 9
 
4. Tariff-rate Adjustment and the CDSOA 
 Whereas the tariff rate is assumed to be predetermined in section 3, in this section the 
government is assumed to adjust the tariff rate optimally when changing the distribution rate. 
In this setup we examine the effect of an increase in the distribution rate on home total surplus 
and the profits of the home and foreign firms.  
 
A. Optimal Tariff under the CDSOA 
 First, we examine. Taking θ as given, total differentiation of (5) with respect to γ yields 
 dW/dγ = [− D + (1 − θ)γy]f′dx/dγ ＋[γf  − (1 − γ)yf′]dy/dγ + yf. (21) 
From (3) and (4) we derive 
 πxxdx + πxydy = − θyf′dγ, 
 π*yxdx + π*yydy = ( f′y + f)dγ, 
from which 
 dx/dγ = [− θyf′π*yy + ( f′y + f)πxy]/Π, 
 dy/dγ = [( f′y + f)πxx +  θyf′π*yx]/Π, (22) 
where Π is given in (8). They are dx/dγ and dy/dγ located in the right-hand side of (21). 
 Given the complexity of the present analysis, we take a simulation method by assuming 
the linear demand and the constant marginal costs given by (16). By substituting (16) into (21) 
and (22) and solving γ that makes dW/dγ equal 0 we obtain the optimal level of γ as a function 
of θ, β/c* and c/c*. It is 
 γ = γopt(θ; β/c*, c/c*), (23) 
where γopt is the solution of  
[α(3 − θγ)3/c*2]dW/dγ = (3 − 3θ + θγ)(β/c*)2 + (6 + 2θγ − 2θ2γ)(β/c*)(c/c*)  
+ (3 + 3θ + θγ − 2θ2γ)(c/c*)2 
+ (− 3 + 6θ − 7θγ − 4θ2γ2 + 5θγ2 + 2θ2γ + θ2γ3)(β/c*)/(1 − γ)2  
+ (− 12 − 6θ + 2θγ + 5θγ2 + θ2γ3 + 6θ2γ − 3θ2γ2 − θ3γ3)(c/c*)/(1 − γ)2 
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+ (3 + θγ − 6γ + 6θγ2 + 3θ2γ2 −4θ2γ3 − 4θ2γ + θ3γ3)/(1 − γ)3 
= 0.   
From the numerical analysis on (23), we obtain a positive relationship between θ and γopt, as 
shown in figure 1 where β/c* = 4 and c/c* = 2.16 Furthermore, we find such a positive 
relationship for any value of β/c* ∈ [1.1, 20] and c/c* ∈ [0.5, min.(β, 10)] both with an interval 
of 0.1.17  
 In conclusion, the optimal tariff rate increases as the rate of tariff revenue distributed to the 
home firm increases. This property is intuitively explained as follows. The CDSOA policy 
reduces the home firm’s output, increases the foreign firm’s output y and raises price p, as 
stated in proposition 1. Consequently, the foreign firm’s revenue py, which is the tariff base, 
increases. It implies the marginal benefit of the tariff to rise and hence the optimal tariff rate to 
be higher.18 
 
B. Welfare Effect of the CDSOA with Tariff-Rate Adjustment 
  Next, we examine the effects on the home and foreign firms’ profits given by (2) and 
home total surplus W given by (5) of a change in the distribution rate when the tariff rate is 
optimally adjusted. Under the linear demand and the constant marginal costs given by (16) the 
shapes of the three functions in three typical cases are illustrated in figure 2 (see the appendix 
for the expressions of the three functions). Given that β/c* = 15, they are case (i) in which c/c* 
= 6.8, case (ii) in which c/c* = 5.8, and case (iii) in which c/c* = 1.1.  
 As shown in figure 2, if the home firm is much less efficient than the foreign firm (case i), 
more distribution to the home firm raises not only both firms’ profits but also home total 
surplus. Moreover, home total surplus is maximized when the government distributes the tariff 
revenue so much that the home firm almost ceases production and only receives the 
                                                 
16 Note that γopt is independent of α. 
17 In this numerical analysis the concavity is found to be valid at every set of (θ, γopt) within this range. 
18 Assuming a specific tariff, Collie and Vandenbussche (2004) find a negative relationship between the 
CDSOA policy and the optimal tariff. It is because they assume the government to attach a higher weight to the 
home firm’s profit than to the tariff revenue and to consumers’ surplus and regard the CDSOA as not the 
tariff-revenue transfer but raising the weight attached to the tariff revenue. In this setting the tariff rate is set at a 
higher level than maximizes the tariff revenue so that the home firm obtains a high profit. Since the CDSOA raises 
the importance of the tariff revenue relative to that of the home firm’s profit, the government reduces the tariff rate 
so as to increase the tariff revenue. 
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tariff-revenue transfer.19 As the home firm’s efficiency improves, partial distribution becomes 
optimal since home total surplus forms a humped shape. It in fact arises when e.g. c/c* = 6.2, 
which we do not exhibit in figure 2. A further improvement in the home firm’s efficiency 
makes no distribution optimal for the home country while full distribution still most benefits 
both firms (case ii). This result is in conformity with that for the case where the tariff rate is 
predetermined, which is summarized in proposition 2. Finally, if the home firm’s cost 
inferiority to the foreign firm is small (case iii), it harms the foreign firm and the home country 
while benefiting only the home firm.  
 Let us intuitively discuss the above result. First, the tariff-revenue distribution to the home 
firm anyway benefits the home firm. Second, if the home firm is very inefficient, the foreign 
firm supplies a lot, implying the benefit of raising the tariff rate owing to an increase in the 
distribution rate to be great. Additionally, since the home firm’s profit per output is low, the 
surplus loss due to its output reduction induced by the CDSOA is small. Thus, the CDSOA 
benefits the home country. Third, as the home government raises the distribution rate and the 
corresponding optimal tariff rate, the home firm tries to increase the tariff-revenue transfer by 
decreasing output. The home firm’s output reduction benefits, while the tariff-rate increase 
harms, the foreign firm. If the home firm is very inefficient, it takes the tariff revenue more 
significant than its own profits and hence vastly reduces output. It causes the former effect to 
dominate the latter, making the foreign firm better off. The opposite mechanism works if the 
cost inferiority of the home firm to the foreign firm is small.  
 In sum, the CDSOA with optimal tariff-rate adjustment benefits both countries if the home 
firm is much less efficient than the foreign firm. If the home firm’s cost inferiority to the 
foreign firm is small, however, the CDSOA harms both countries while making only the home 
firm better off.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 We analyze the implication of the US Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
(CDSOA, otherwise known as the Byrd Amendment) using an international Cournot duopoly 
model. Under the CDSOA the home government imposes an ad valorem tariff on the foreign 
                                                 
19 It implies that removing a much less efficient firm benefits the world economy. This result is consistent with 
that of Lahiri and Ono (1988; 2004, Chapters 1 and 4) –i.e., removing a very inefficient firm from the market 
raises total welfare in a closed economy. Also, note that under the US CDSOA a firm has to keep producing a 
minimal amount of the commodity in order to receive tariff-revenue payments, as stated in footnote 14.  
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firm to protect the home import-competing firm and further distributes a part of the tariff 
revenue to the home firm, --i.e., the home firm receives double protection. We examine the 
effects of this policy on the home firm’s profit, the foreign firm’s profit and home total surplus. 
 Although foreign firms and governments criticize the US CDSOA, we find that it always 
benefits the foreign firm as well as the home firm if the tariff rate is predetermined. It urges the 
home firm to restrict output so that the foreign firm increases production and pays higher 
tariffs. Thus, the commodity price rises and home consumers are worse off. In sum, the 
CDSOA facilitates a tacit collusion between the home and the foreign firm at the cost of 
consumers’ surplus. Consequently, home total surplus may increase or decrease depending on 
the market size and the two firms’ marginal costs. Particularly, if the market is sufficiently 
large or if the home firm’s cost inferiority to the foreign firm is small, distributing no tariff 
revenue to the home firm is the optimal policy. However, if the market size is sufficiently small 
or if the home firm is much less efficient than the foreign firm, the CDSOA increases home 
total surplus as well as both firms’ profits.  
 If the tariff rate is optimally chosen, an increase in the distribution rate raises the optimal 
tariff rate, viz. a result that may be a concern to the foreign firm. Despite an increase in the 
tariff rate, however, the foreign firm’s profit increases under the CDSOA as long as it is much 
more efficient than the home firm. It does because increases in the distribution rate and the 
tariff rate make it profitable for the home firm to expand tariff revenue by reducing output 
significantly and giving a larger market share to the foreign firm. While both firms enjoy the 
benefit of the CDSOA, only home consumers are worse off. The loss of consumers is however 
dominated by the increases in the home firm’s profit and the tariff revenue. 
 If the cost superiority of the foreign firm over the home firm is not so outstanding, the loss 
of consumers is so large that home total surplus declines whereas the foreign firm is still better 
off. Furthermore, if the foreign firm’s superiority over the home firm is small, the CDSOA 
reduces not only home total surplus but also the foreign firm’s profit.  
 In sum, if the home firm faces a much stronger foreign rival firm, the CDSOA benefits not 
only the home country but also the foreign firm, although most foreign exporters complain of 
it. However, if the home firm is not so much inferior to the foreign firm, the government should 
not apply the CDSOA to the industry since it harms both the foreign firm and the home country 
while only the home firm is better off.  
 13
Appendix: Functional Forms under Linear Demand and Costs  
 Applying (16) and (17) to (2) and (5) yields the following functions: 
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where γ = γopt(θ; β/c*, c/c*) given by (23). Figure 2 illustrates these values as functions of θ. 
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Figure 1: The optimal tariff rate (β/c*  = 4, c/c* = 2) 
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Figure 2: The effect of changing the distribution rate (β/c*  = 15) 
 
(i) c/c*  = 6.8, 0 < θ < 0.60948 (at which x = 0). 
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(ii) c/c* = 5.8, 0 < θ < 0.88365 (at which x = 0). 
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(iii) c/c* = 1.1, 0 < θ < 1 (x > 0 and y > 0 in this range). 
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